A Pedestrian Mall Born Out of Urban Renewal: Lawrence Halprin Associates and Harland Bartholomew & Associates in Charlottesville, Virginia

by Sarita M. Herman

Deterioration, Demolition and Rebirth

The downtown of Charlottesville, Virginia embodies changes that took place in American city planning from the mid-twentieth century to the late-twentieth century. The most powerful element of this change was a shift away from a demolition-oriented program known as urban renewal, to a more socially conscious, preservation-oriented form of planning. This change is best understood through a comparison of the work of two national firms that made a major impact on the form and identity of the city: Harland Bartholomew & Associates (HB&A - principal planner Robert Martin) in the late 1950s to early 1970s and Lawrence Halprin Associates (LHA - principal designer Dean Abbott) from 1973-76. This juxtaposition reveals why LHA's plan to revitalize the city has succeeded where HB&A's failed.

Today, the pedestrian Mall at the heart of the central business district, or CBD, designed by Lawrence Halprin Associates from 1973-76, is bursting with life and activity in spite of the economic downturn of recent years. Halprin's Mall facilitates living, civic gathering, entertainment, and business downtown. As evidence of the Mall's importance, City Hall has recently spent $6 million on a renovation of Charlottesville's most prominent public space.1 The Mall has become crucial to the identity of the city. It is hard to imagine that this thriving downtown could have been in distress a short time ago. However, a crisis common to American cities created a dire need for large-scale planning efforts in Charlottesville in the mid-twentieth century. Beginning with the great depression of the 1930s, Charlottesville saw a slow but ever apparent decline in the downtown area.2 As automobiles encroached upon an ill-equipped infrastructure, businesses fled to suburban areas better suited to support automotive transportation. Auto-friendly

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suburban neighborhoods appealed to residents, further encouraging a move away from living downtown. This organizational shift undermined the CBD of Charlottesville, centered on Main Street. Without shoppers living nearby or sufficient space to accommodate parking, the heart of the city could no longer sustain businesses at the level it had in the past. Once vibrant residential neighborhoods began to degrade, while low-rent businesses or, even worse, vacancies, replaced what had been the economic core of the city. Segregation divided the town and created an atmosphere of racial tension. Instability created an identity crisis in the city, which factored heavily in the decisions of city leaders, citizens, and national planning firms over the next half-decade.

By the 1950s, the city government decided they needed outside assistance to meet the challenges they faced. In 1956, the Charlottesville Housing and Redevelopment Authority (CHRA), chaired by David Wood Jr., along with the Charlottesville Planning Commission and the City Council, composed of Thomas J. Michie, A. C. Coleman, Sol B. Weinberg, L. L. Scribner, and James E. Bowen Jr., hired the nationwide firm of urban planning experts, Harland Bartholomew & Associates. The city invited the firm to clean up traffic problems and clear “blighted” residential neighborhoods out of the central business district in an attempt to reinvigorate business downtown. It was this firm’s plans that guided the urban renewal of Vinegar Hill in the

Downtown Mall, Summer 2008, Courtesy of Lauren Noe.
mid-1960s. However, the Bartholomew firm was also the first to propose a pedestrian mall in the heart of Charlottesville. A series of major planning and redevelopment efforts followed the Bartholomew plan, culminating in the 1973 hire of Lawrence Halprin Associates to design the downtown Mall and develop a Master Plan for the downtown area. The Halprin Master is often overshadowed by the popularity of Mall design in the public eye. However, it was the Master's emphasis, that many elements within the city must work in harmony to make a downtown healthy, which has been most crucial to the success of LHA's Mall.

History of Planning in Charlottesville

Concurrent with national trends, the pace of city planning efforts increased dramatically in the mid-twentieth century in Charlottesville. However, there had been some form of planning in Charlottesville from the founding of the city. Both Harland Bartholomew & Associates and Lawrence Halprin Associates expressed knowledge of this history in their plans for the city. However, while HB&A were willing to demolish most of the material that represented Charlottesville's planning history, LHA embraced it and allowed it to influence their designs to create a plan that was unique to place and built on an existing identity.

The original grid of Charlottesville's central business district first took shape in 1762, when Albemarle County moved its seat from Scottsville to Charlottesville. The first land commissioner of Charlottesville, Thomas Walker, drew up the original town deeds. With no previous settlement history, Charlottesville was a planned community from its inception. Chosen for the advantage of a point of trade along the Rivanna River, surveyors sited the town along a ridge dividing a series of hills. Of the 1,000 acres the county acquired for Charlottesville, Walker initially subdivided 50 into lots to form the town. There were approximately 100 residents by 1765. By 1818, the year the Board of Trustees chartered the University of Virginia (Central College), the town had grown to a population of 1,500.

Some attribute the small-scale streets and grid of approximately one acre per block, laid out by Thomas Walker, as a reason for the success of the downtown Mall, as they create an easily walkable, pedestrian-scale network of blocks unlike that of most cities. The 1762 survey established a width of 66 feet for the five original east/west streets including Main Street. The same plan laid out six north/south cross streets 33 feet in width. Private land deeds established alleys, averaging 15 feet in width, which cut through the blocks in an ad-hoc manner over time as the blocks developed, creating intimately scaled semi-private spaces within the public network of blocks and streets.
Though the original survey created some order in Charlottesville's heart, there was no institutionalized planning in the city for many years. It was not until 1926 that the state of Virginia enacted legislation legalizing institutional public planning and zoning. Three years later, Charlottesville adopted its first zoning ordinance. The Council established a local City Planning Commission (CPC), made up of city leaders and executives rather than professional planners, in 1934. The city of Charlottesville did not employ a full-time professional planning engineer until 1951. In 1959, the year of the first official Master Plan, the CPC consisted primarily of business leaders from the community with little or no training in city planning. Dr. Lorin A. Thompson, a respected local physician with no planning experience, chaired the CPC. The only professional planner employed in the city at the time was the City Planning Engineer, Thompson A. Dyke. Given the novelty of professional planning in Charlottesville, it comes as no surprise that the Planning Commission looked to an established professional planning firm to assist in developing the city’s first Master Plan from 1955-59.¹²

Harland Bartholomew & Associates: Reform by Demolition

The City of Charlottesville first contacted the national planning firm of Harland Bartholomew & Associates in late 1955 for a Master Plan proposal from the firm, which they produced in January of 1956. In March of 1956, the City Planning Commission and the Charlottesville Housing and Redevelopment Authority recommended that the City Council authorize the hire of Harland Bartholomew & Associates to develop a “Master Plan and workable program for Charlottesville.”¹³ The council approved this action and over the next fifteen years, working out of their Atlanta, GA and Richmond, VA offices, HB&A produced a number of planning documents for the city.

Harland Bartholomew was a pioneer in the fledgling city planning movement in America and a charter member of the American City Planning Institute (or the American Institute of Planners).¹⁴ In 1913, civil engineer E. P. Goodrich hired Bartholomew to work on one of the first comprehensive master plans for an American city in Newark, NJ.¹⁵ He went on to start his own planning firm in 1919. Bartholomew’s 1936 Urban Land Use Plan for downtown St. Louis was one of the first to employ the concepts of land use and zoning for the purpose of wholesale clearance of urban slums known as urban renewal.¹⁶ By 1956, Harland Bartholomew & Associates was one of the largest planning firms in America, with offices all over the nation. Bartholomew himself was on presidential appointment as the Chairman of the National Capital Planning Commission in Washington, DC during the
making of the Charlottesville *Comprehensive Plan*. Due to the size of his firm and the large number of plans it produced within a given year, Bartholomew himself was not directly responsible for the content of the Charlottesville plans. Nevertheless, his philosophies permeated the work of his firm. Bartholomew trained most of his associates on the job because of the lack of professional planning programs in universities at the time. In Charlottesville, the “field man” was Robert L. Martin. Though he worked on the project in Charlottesville for many years, the city did not hire him. By the early 1970s, the local planning department had begun to question the effectiveness of his strategies.

Bartholomew employed a concept called the “neighborhood unit” popularized by the influential urban planner Clarence A. Perry. This strategy emphasized a separation of commercial, industrial, and residential uses. Residential “neighborhood units” revolved around parks and schools rather than business or industry. In the mid-twentieth century, planners believed a dense mixture of commercial, industrial, and residential uses within small areas in cities contributed to problems of disease, crime, and general immorality. Bartholomew employed Perry’s “neighborhood unit” strategy in an attempt to update the housing of poor people to meet government standards established by federal housing acts. However, by moving residents

away from business and industry, this strategy reinforced reliance on the automobile, or public transportation, to get people from home to their place of work or shopping, making transportation inherently less affordable for those who would have been able to walk to work in the past.

The *Preliminary Report Upon Housing* for Charlottesville expressed the importance the Bartholomew firm placed on housing:

No part of a city plan may be said to be the most important. No city can be beautiful; no city can be efficient or wholesome unless all of its functions operate in harmony. Yet the importance of housing can hardly be overestimated either from the standpoint of the individual or the city.\(^{22}\)

The report went on to emphasize that blighted housing affected the whole city and contributed to the deterioration of the CBD. "Studies in many cities have emphasized the relation that exists between bad housing and disease, crime, structural fires and juvenile delinquency."\(^{25}\) A cursory examination of these incidences in Charlottesville did indeed seem to indicate that they were concentrated in areas HB&A defined as "blighted", or "slums." However, as the report pointed out, the “blighted” areas were also the most densely populated neighborhoods in Charlottesville.\(^{24}\) Wherever there is a higher concentration of people, there is necessarily a higher concentration of social ills, as well as advantages such as sense of community, strong social institutions, and proximity of individuals willing to help one and other.\(^{25}\) However, HB&A examined none of these advantages in their evaluation of Charlottesville neighborhoods.

HB&A established two categories by which they determined the quality of housing in Charlottesville: Building Characteristics and Neighborhood Characteristics. Divided into several subcategories, HB&A used these qualities to assess every neighborhood in Charlottesville. Building Characteristics included structural stability, indoor plumbing and a flush water closet, heat, light, ventilation, and living space. Many residents in the city's dense urban neighborhoods were renters, meaning that building characteristics were largely beyond their control. While these categories were relatively objective, Neighborhood Characteristics were more subjective. They included "provision of necessary utilities," "homogeneity of land use and housing characteristics" (meaning that even if your house met all of the building standards, it could still be deemed blighted based on its surroundings), neighborhood size, educational and recreational facilities, and adequate provision for traffic. While building characteristics were out of renters' control, neighborhood characteristics were in the hands of the
city government and private developers, beyond the control even of homeowners. Based on these standards, HB&A advised the city to do wholesale demolition, known as urban renewal, in select areas of the city. They placed the highest priority on the redevelopment of Vinegar Hill and the second highest on the Garrett Street area. In a period of racial segregation, city utilities, parks, schools, and traffic, elements used to define neighborhood characteristics did not serve Black neighborhoods as efficiently as White neighborhoods. The “neighborhood unit” strategy was inherently biased against Black neighborhoods in Charlottesville, where a strategic lack of zoning had allowed industrial and commercial development to take place amongst residential development. This was in contrast to White neighborhoods where the earliest zoning laws protected houses from commercial and industrial encroachment.

Demolition of the Vinegar Hill neighborhood on the west side of the CBD was the first of the city’s urban renewal projects and has become the most infamous. Irish immigrants founded the Vinegar Hill neighborhood during the late 1800s, but over time it transformed into the predominant Black section of downtown, containing businesses, social institutions, entertainment and housing for the Black community. Advocates of urban renewal described the interior of the neighborhood as having a “rural” condition. Subsistence farming continued on the Hill in spite of its urban surroundings. In the 1950s, nineteenth-century buildings in varying states of stability made up the housing stock on the Hill. The Vinegar Hill neighborhood did not meet HB&A’s Neighborhood Characteristics outlined in the Preliminary Report Upon Housing. Race was a major factor in this. Along with the physical instability of some buildings on the Hill came the social instability of the racially divided city during the period of school desegregation and massive resistance.

In a 1960 speech preceding the referendum to vote on the urban renewal of Vinegar Hill, Mayor Michie stated, “From a financial point of view as well as from a social and cultural point of view, the substitution of a fine modern business section for the slum area now existing back of Vinegar Hill would be the most forward looking step that has been taken in Charlottesville in many, many years.”

The economy of the White downtown was a major reason for the city government to remove this neighborhood from downtown. There was a national mindset at the time that slum, or “blighted,” conditions would spread like a contagion and be unsolvable by private interest groups. In the periods of urban renewal, cities used blighted housing conditions as an excuse to demolish entire neighborhoods and relocate to public
housing residents who could not afford to buy homes. The Charlottesvile Redevelopment and Housing Authority (CRHA) was the local organization in charge of urban renewal and public housing projects in the mid-twentieth century. Charles Johnson, head of the CRHA in 1965, pushed the notion that poverty was the primary reason for urban renewal on the Hill. Johnson insisted that there was no way to solve slum conditions without wiping out the entire nineteenth-century building stock on Vinegar Hill. "We never had any planning in the beginning. Things were plopped down and that was that. The decay of the core cities couldn't be arrested. The idea was to start over." As a result, the city demolished all buildings on the Hill, whether or not they were sound, and relocated residents. Though Johnson was one of urban renewal's staunchest supporters, even he acknowledged the major problem with razing the entire neighborhood, "No question about it, we moved people out. People had roots there and that's the sad part of it." The roots that Johnson speaks of were impossible to rebuild once the community was broken up. A discernable urban center for the Black community on the scale of Vinegar Hill has failed to develop in Charlottesville in the fifty-year period since the demolition of the Hill.

In spite of the well-known indictments of urban renewal that had been growing in the 1950s-60s, including Martin Anderson's *The Federal Bulldozer* and Jane Jacobs' *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, it was not demolition of a neighborhood, but rather the construction of public housing that made urban renewal a controversial issue in Charlottesville. Middle-class residents were concerned about where CHRA would place poor Blacks once their neighborhood was gone. CRHA had to find a site for the public housing that would not disrupt segregation in the school system or locate those displaced within a White, or even a middle-class Black neighborhood. The 1960 redevelopment referendum to demolish Vinegar Hill, voted on mainly by White citizens due in part to a $1.50 poll tax, passed only by a narrow margin.

Traffic Flow and Development Expansion

The Vinegar Hill urban renewal project was part of a larger plan that also involved moving the Belmont Bridge and creating the still controversial Meadowcreek Parkway. HB&A based these plans on extremely exaggerated population growth estimates. Charlottesville had recently experienced a population boom beyond the average growth rate of American cities. The firm was mistaken in their assumption that this growth rate would continue. Nevertheless, the growth of auto traffic had become a burden on the
eighteenth-century infrastructure of downtown. Historic photographs show that cars had taken over the 66 ft. wide Main Street (see page 78). The Bartholomew firm claimed that streets in Vinegar Hill were small and irregular, not following the grid of the rest of downtown. However, beyond the original 1761, 28-block grid downtown, few streets in Charlottesville follow an axial plan, whether in wealthy or poor neighborhoods. This is caused by the constraints of Charlottesville's hilly topography with a series of streams and ridges, which limited the development of a structured street system. Rather than embrace this historical element of the city's layout, HB&Co attempted to wipe the slate clean. Vinegar Hill was a strategic location where the CBD could have it all—a large-scale connector road and acres of suburban-style surface parking.

Along with the problems of the original street system came a desire to follow national trends to improve high speed transportation through connection to the interstate highway system. HB&Co's plans provided for connections to the U.S. 250 Bypass and Interstate 64, both built in the late 1950s and 60s. Though part of a push toward "progress," these high-speed routes had the potential to further hurt downtown by making the suburbs even more convenient. To accompany connections to highways, the city wanted more efficient traffic flow through the CBD and to provide a place for suburban-style development. In a 1960 open letter to the people of Charlottesville, Mayor Michie wrote, "some one had the idea that not merely the worst slum houses back of Vinegar Hill should be torn down to be replaced elsewhere by good public housing, but that the whole area should be converted into a fine, modern business area, an extension of the downtown Main Street area which was blocked from moving in that direction by the existence of this slum." Ridge McIntire Road was the solution; by moving the slum out of Vinegar Hill, the city removed the "blockage" Mayor Michie spoke of, making it possible for traffic to flow efficiently through downtown and White development to continue westward.

While it is difficult to defend the massive demolition of a minority neighborhood, it is fair to note that Bartholomew had a specific development plan for Vinegar Hill. It had many faults, including an abundance of surface parking and no attempt to connect to West Main or provide housing for displaced residents and businesses within the renewal zone. However, it was at least an organized plan. The city did not follow Bartholomew's plan, nor did they quickly replace it with a better plan of their own; rather, they allowed haphazard private development on the site, which led to the slow and disjointed development of the Hill.
The First Mall Plan

Bartholomew's plan, like Halprin's, connected Vinegar Hill to the eastern portion of downtown by creating a "pedestrian-friendly" commercial district. Bartholomew's concept for a pseudo-mall in Charlottesville was the first serious plan for a devoted pedestrian area in Charlottesville. It gave city leaders a direction for downtown and led to the hire of Lawrence Halprin. However, there are some striking physical and philosophical differences between what HB&A designed and what exists today. Rather than one long artery along the historic CBD on Main Street, Bartholomew designed a series of mini-malls on Vinegar Hill and Water Street. There was a major difference in the "pedestrian" allowed for in HB&A's plan and those that Halprin would design for. Bartholomew imagined that they would arrive downtown exclusively by car and walk only a short distance to the shopping district. Conversely, Halprin would try to encourage housing closer to the Mall, creating pedestrians that walked directly from their residences to the shopping area. It is apparent in Bartholomew's plan that it is not the pedestrian, but the automobile that is given primacy. Devoting several blocks of First, Third and Water Streets to the pedestrian would have created
easy access to parking garages surrounding the entire area and segregating the commercial district from the rest of the city. The garages ranged from a half-acre to two acres in footprint, some of them twice the size of a historic city block. South Street would have been enlarged to 80 ft. from the historic 66, allowing it to become a high-speed, high-volume thoroughfare, while Main Street would be narrowed and physically as well as visibly cut off from the rest of the city.

Main Street would not have been the centerpiece of the CBD in this plan, as it would become in LHA’s design. That role was given to the newly cleared Vinegar Hill area, where HB&A placed a suburban-style commercial building with a 3-acre footprint. Pedestrian areas, rather than feeding out into the rest of the city, would have conveniently combined blocks into sets of two and four, effectively creating mega-blocks that had the potential for future large-scale development. In no way did this plan attempt to preserve the historic scale or land use of the CBD. Bartholomew’s plans replaced the precededented mixed-use of the area with a strictly divided commercial center. Pedestrian connections between mini-malls were weak, arguably little more than crosswalks, and pedestrian connections to surrounding residential neighborhoods were nonexistent.

The city never adopted Bartholomew’s CBD Plan, though the council did implement several elements, including the demolition of Vinegar Hill and the building of Ridge McIntire Road. Some city government officials praised the plan, but they did not know how to implement it. A regime change occurred within the city government during the late-1960s-early-1970s. Bartholomew’s plan had staunch critics among the new officials that came into the city. One of these critics was a young city planner by the name of Thomas Conger, with Master’s degrees in geography and city planning from the University of Cincinnati, whom the council hired in 1971 as the director of the newly formed (1968) Planning Department. Conger’s 1971 report, Alternatives for Charlottesville: The City Planning Department’s Master Plan Recommendations, was especially critical of Bartholomew’s final revision to the Master Plan, written in 1970, stating that it contained “a number of inconsistent, unnecessary and fiscally unsound recommendations therein.” Charlottesville’s new director of planning critiqued HB&A’s plans for street enlargement, lack of bicycle and pedestrian routes, and perhaps most poignantly, the use of urban renewal. “Experiments in urban renewal have shown that neighborhoods develop slowly and through complicated processes. We must not be careless in our destruction of neighborhoods, for new ones are difficult to create and old ones almost impossible to relocate.”

Conger was not alone in his views. He was supported by a new group of city leaders including the city council, manager and planning department. In 1971, the City Council appointed a new City Manager named Cole Hendrix. The 36-year-old Kansas native moved to Charlottesville after serving as the assistant city manager of Kansas City, MO. Hendrix received his B.A. in political science and M.A. in public administration from the University of Kansas. In the early 1970s, a newly elected all-democrat council felt a strong sense of urgency for change in the city. In 1972, the Council was comprised of Mayor Francis Fife, Vice President of the People's Bank, Vice Mayor Charles Barbour, former Mayor Mitchell Van Yahres, owner of the Van Yahres Tree Company, George Gilliam, an attorney and graduate of UVa's school of law, and Jill Rinehart, a social activist and the wife of Bill Rinehart, a prominent baker.

This council was not only progressive for racially integrating the city government, it was also historic for its inclusion of the first woman councilmember, Jill Rinehart, as well as the first Black councilmember, Charles Barbour. Rinehart was active in Charlottesville politics for many years and paved the way to the many women council members that have followed in her footsteps. Councilman and later Mayor Charles Barbour was a firm supporter of the Mall project from its beginning, and saw his participation in the timeline of the city's most significant urban landscape as a landmark for the Black community in Charlottesville. Barbour was one of the two council members allowed to vote on funding the Mall in 1973. Two years later, as Charlottesville's first Black mayor, Barbour participated in the official groundbreaking ceremony for the Mall. In 1976, Barbour laid the commemorative last brick, during the Mall's opening ceremony. Today, the casual visitor amid the array of upscale boutiques, restaurants and condos that populate the landscape easily overlooks this important connection to Black and women's history in the community.

Lawrence Halprin Associates

The city manager's office and council were looking to other pedestrian malls for guidance on how to go about constructing a mall in Charlottesville when the dean of the University of Virginia's architecture school, Joe Bosserman, suggested that Hendrix consider Lawrence Halprin Associates. The city planning office sent an intermediate mall plan to LHA in 1972, shortly after the city first contacted the firm. The plan shows a meandering transit mall running down Main Street which appears to refer to Halprin's design for Nicollet Mall in Minneapolis, MN, and is strikingly similar to
what Charlottesville has today, though very simplistic. Later in 1972, James Coleman of LHA recommended to Thomas Conger that he contact Mr. O. D. Gay of Minneapolis in reference to his questions about the success of Nicollet Mall. Halprin designed Nicollet Mall in the mid-1960s to deal with some of the same pressures facing Charlottesville, the development of a suburban mall competing with downtown retail, and a new interstate freeway threatening to route traffic away from Minneapolis’ CBD. Nicollet was a successful project in achieving compromises between merchants, city leaders, and citizens of Minneapolis. The design appealed to Charlottesville’s leaders who had also seen many failed malls and were aware of their potential to do more harm than good.

Though pedestrian malls in cities have become a rarity, the notion was quite popular in the mid-twentieth century. Austrian-born shopping center designer Victor Gruen popularized the pedestrian mall concept. Gruen blamed the prominence of the automobile for depersonalizing American cities and alienating people from each other. His solution was to employ downtown many of the strategies he had used to make suburban shopping centers successful. Inspired by European pedestrian city streets, Gruen wished to separate pedestrian traffic in CBDs from other kinds of transportation, giving pedestrians priority over cars. Though Gruen is credited as the father of the pedestrian mall, he believed that a mall by itself could not effect change but had to be a part of a larger series of solutions to remove automobiles from urban cores.

Pedestrian malls were born out of the same era as urban renewal. While Lawrence Halprin was willing to work within the constraints of an era of city planning bent on urban renewal, he was not an urban renewal booster. His work served as a mediator between large-scale demolition for business interests and historic and social preservation. Halprin understood that urban renewal was problematic because of its racial implications. In Halprin’s 1968 report, New York, New York, written for the New York Department of Housing and Urban Development, Halprin wrote, “The black community does not want the white community to impose its own middle class standards...The black community must, we believe, structure its own renewal. But open occupancy, opportunities for economic advancement, job opportunities and increased ability for property ownership must underlie the whole forward thrust.” Halprin acknowledged that housing upgrades were not a solution for the Black community if they were not part of a larger plan in which Black people had agency. Halprin Associates did a well-publicized open space network in Portland, OR between 1967-68, and the Seattle, WA Freeway Park in 1976,
both projects in cities that had suffered from overzealous urban renewal efforts and both successful projects that are still in use.\textsuperscript{63}

Lawrence Halprin (1916-2009) was an influential Modernist American landscape architect.\textsuperscript{64} He worked under Thomas Church and was associated with the "Modern" California school of landscape design, but was much more interested in the social, emotional, and psychological implications of landscape design than many of his peers.\textsuperscript{65} Most of his well-known projects were built during the 1960s and '70s. These include Ghirardelli Square at Fisherman's Wharf in San Francisco, which he did with the firm Wurster, Bernardi and Emmons, 1964, and the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial in Washington, DC, 1974. His work is typified by minimalistic rectilinear planes, dramatic topography, use of water, and choreographed movement throughout. Choreographed movement through space and user participation was very important to Halprin, who developed a process to facilitate the activities that he called R.S.V.P.: Resources, Scores, Valuation and Performance.\textsuperscript{66} Though he had a successful national firm and had received several prominent commissions by 1973, he was not above accepting small, low-profile projects like the Charlottesville Pedestrian Mall. Unlike Harland Bartholomew, Lawrence Halprin did visit Charlottesville a couple of times. However, Dean Abbott, a landscape architect in Halprin's New York office was the principal designer of the Pedestrian Mall and Norm Kondy, an associate in his San Francisco office, produced the bulk of the Master Plan. Though Halprin did not do most of the legwork for the design, he oversaw the design process and had final approval on the project.\textsuperscript{67}

Workshops and Proposals

Council commissioned LHA to make a Mall/CBD plan as opposed to a comprehensive plan for the entire city. Though the firm did not propose solutions for as wide an area as Bartholomew's, LHA's plan was more about connecting the city and making the Mall part of a larger set of solutions. LHA considered the CBD Master Plan proposal to be so integral to the proposal for the Mall that they presented the two side-by-side in one document.\textsuperscript{68} In a memo to Cole Hendrix, LHA wrote, "We feel that the Master Plan and Mall are very closely interrelated and that many decisions made in the development of one effect the other." Many city leaders agreed with Halprin's notion that the Mall would not be an independent solution. Councilman Mitchell Van Yahres stated, "I believe it [the Mall] will be the beginning, and I want to underscore the beginning, of the rejuvenation of downtown Charlottesville. Other things will have to happen or the Mall will
It is likely that Van Yahres adopted this view during a crucial part of Halprin’s design process known as the “Take Part Community Workshop.”

Halprin’s design approach was transparent to the public in comparison to past plans, which had been produced with little community input. The community participated in the design of the Mall through the Take Part Community Workshop, a process invented by Halprin. He wanted the Workshop “to establish and encourage community participation.”

Through the process, LHA’s designers would learn about the city, but more importantly, citizens would begin to look at their city in new ways and understand Halprin’s approach to design. For three days in 1973, members of the community participated with Halprin and some of his associates in activities designed to generate creative interaction with the urban environment. Halprin wanted participants to go out into the community and share these experiences with other citizens, becoming advocates for LHA’s designs.

The Charlottesville Take Part Workshop was important not only for the city but also for Lawrence Halprin – it was the first time he was able fully to implement his innovative notions of a choreographed community design process into a built detailed design and an adopted master plan.

The workshops were highly effective in helping city leaders understand Halprin’s intentions and communicate them to the larger community. The process also inspired city leaders to continue to implement notions that came out of the Workshop, like the idea that more housing and social institutions were needed downtown, or the concept that downtown should function as a “community center” rather than just an economic core.

City Manager Cole Hendrix credits his experience in Halprin’s Take Part Workshop for giving him the ability to understand the city by walking and experiencing it in different ways, a tool he continued to implement in his long career as City Manager of Charlottesville.

In spite of its comparative openness, the workshop approach was not without its detractors. In particular, a group of Architecture professors at the University of Virginia, led by Robert Vickery and Theo van Groll, were concerned that the workshop contained an unbalanced proportion of government leaders. Out of 32 participants selected from the city of Charlottesville, three were city council members, nine were central city commission members, and only one was a designer. It should come as no surprise that many of the participants were city leaders, considering that the contract stipulated their participation in project review. The Take Part Workshop was not a method to allow citizens to design the Mall. The intent of Halprin with the Take Part process was to create a social background for
the Mall and Master Plan and foster community support for the project through understanding.

Along with professors Vickery and van Groll, the Mall had some staunch opponents among downtown business owners. While those associated with the banks supported the notion of a Mall, most smaller business owners were opposed to it, with the exception of a far-sighted few.79 Many city leaders in this period were associated with the banks; three council members had relationships with powerful banking institutions in Charlottesville.80 The various city commissions were also comprised largely of White male business leaders, many of whom had banking connections. These individuals tended to be interested in the long-term economic health of downtown. Small business owners, who were more concerned with their individual success, recognized that the Mall had the potential to cause a major restructuring in the types of shoppers and businesses downtown.81 The Mall did force many of these small business owners to move and put others out of business.

One of the Mall’s major opponents was Lee Hoff, who owned an automobile service station on Main Street.82 In Hoff’s case, there was real reason for concern. He was justified in the expectation that he could not continue to run a service station on Main Street if people could not drive their cars to his business. The most vocal opponent of the Mall was Harry O’Manksy, owner of the Young Men’s Shop, a clothing store on the portion of West Main where the Mall was planned. O’Manksy had relationships with many of the Council members and other city leaders, including Councilman Van Yahres, with whom he toured several other existing malls in the region, though the two men differed in their opinion of the fitness of a mall for Charlottesville.83 It was O’Manksy’s opposition that inhibited the scale of the Mall and budget of the project. His claim of a conflict of interest with three of the council members, Rinehart, Gilliam, and Fife, forced them to abstain from voting on the Mall, though they were all strongly in favor of it. These three council members had associations with banking institutions, which O’Mansky claimed had a stake in the Mall project. George Gilliam was an attorney for one of the banks, Jill Rinehart was married to a banker, and Francis Fife was Vice President of People’s Bank.84

The Mall was not an investment in protecting the existing 1973 businesses on Main Street. It was an investment in a long-term reinvention of the historic central business district. Nevertheless, there were small business owners that supported the Mall. One of the most outspoken of these was the owner of the Nook restaurant on Main Street, Mary Williams. Williams was probably more far-sighted than many small business owners
downtown, as reflected in her position at the time as the president of Downtown Charlottesville Inc. As a restaurant owner she also may have recognized the potential of the Mall to extend dining space for her restaurant through outdoor café space. Williams was one of the few downtown small business owners included in the Take Part Workshop.

While opposition to the Mall in Charlottesville was vocal, the Council voted to go ahead with the Mall plans. In an open letter to the people of Charlottesville published in the Daily Progress, George Gilliam addressed the controversy:

I, as one councilman, believe that this is the time for the council to 'take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.' I believe that we as councilmen should applaud the efforts of those citizens and professionals who have worked so hard for so long to develop a viable and realistic plan for downtown. I believe we should thank those who have taken the time to give us the benefit of opposing views. But, most importantly, we should vote with confidence to turn the central city in a new direction. We should be the leaders. While our decision may be criticized in the future, we should not let it be said that we did not try to save the core of our city.

Gilliam's statement reflects the sense of urgency for change within the city government at the time. This was a council that was willing to make unpopular decisions for the good of the city.

The Mall and Master Plan

Mixed uses prevailed in Halprin's master plan instead of the heterogeneous neighborhood approach taken by Bartholomew. Halprin's plan suggested housing above businesses downtown and all around the Mall. The plan stated, "Housing in the downtown area would give a 24-hour population and thus add a certain life and activity, and hence safety to the downtown during the evening hours." Halprin took a different approach to density as well. Instead of increasing business density by building skyscrapers, Halprin's plan suggested retaining the historic character of the downtown by retaining commercial density, but reintroducing some of the residential density that had been lost over the past forty years. Halprin also proposed single family, duplex, and elderly housing in the Garrett Street renewal area.

Along with being a landscape design, the Mall was a preservation project, preserving the scale and historic character of the CBD. Unlike Bartholomew's plans, LHA's work embraced the history of the city. The plan included the
expansion of the Court Square historic district south, into the proposed Mall area for the following purpose:

The whole downtown could easily end up an exclusive financial, professional, or governmental area. Such a developmental trend would destroy the streetscape and activity which Charlottesville has long enjoyed. To keep the tiger at the gates, a ring was drawn around that part of the old town which people wished to preserve. This, more or less, takes in the entire area between Market and Water Streets, and Second St. West and Seventh Street.

The report went on to detail three methods through which the city would achieve preservation of the CBD. First was to keep the automobile out by making the area less accessible to cars. The second step was to limit building heights, a step completely contrary to Bartholomew's notion that, after 1990, growth in downtown Charlottesville would be primarily vertical. In Halprin's plan, large high-rise buildings would be discouraged, because those buildings required greater access. The Halprin plan wanted to limit new building heights in the preservation district to 40 feet, much lower than the nine stories allowed by current historic district guidelines. The third method to preserve the old town was to make it more attractive, stating, "Improving its attractiveness would stop... deterioration, increase its earning potential and encourage stability and permanence among its businesses."

Lawrence Halprin's 1964 project, Ghiradelli Square at Fisherman's Wharf in San Francisco, was a preservation project for an existing chocolate factory, perhaps what would be termed "adaptive reuse" today. Halprin called Ghirardelli Square a "recycling" project. His intention was not to keep the buildings' use but to repurpose the existing structure of the old chocolate factory for a new function as a shopping center. About the project, Halprin stated, "I also think this is a demonstration of what a whole city could do, if you could imagine it ten times bigger." This was one of the goals of the Charlottesville Mall, to preserve the physical material at the heart of this city, but make it viable through a new use.

LHA acknowledged the unique and attractive character of the town of Charlottesville and its historical architecture. "There are few cities with so unique a background in creative design and planning as Charlottesville – It was the home of the First Architect of the Nation, Mr. Thomas Jefferson. His influence is still a rich source of inspiration and it is hoped that it is reflected in this plan." The material of the Mall had a specific relationship to its location – brick pavers and runnels related to historic forms LHA
documented in the court square area during their first visit to the city (see below). Halprin Associates suggested preserving the visual character of the historic CBD. The Report on the Master Plan states, "The quality of character, scale, and texture of the older structures in downtown was a unique possession well worth maintaining... to insure that the human scale of buildings would be with us to enjoy in the coming years, has been fundamental to this plan." LHA used the "character, scale, and texture" as the frame for its landscape design, making the shop fronts of old buildings the walls of an outdoor room.

The Halprin Mall was an urban landscape network very unlike Bartholomew’s flimsily connected system of mega-blocks. LHA was sensitive to the location of the Mall within the community and traffic flow around it. The firm went through several potential traffic plans before settling on the final design. LHA’s plan created a large section devoted solely to the pedestrian, instead of having pedestrian ways interact with automobile traffic. The Master Plan clearly stated the reason for separating pedestrian and auto traffic:

Accommodating the automobile leaves little or no space for urban amenities... The acknowledged intrusion of the auto on the psychological environment occurs pell-mell. Accommodating the pedestrian interrupts the smooth flow of traffic. The recommendation to the City therefore is to separate the two, particularly in the more intense areas of downtown.  

The "intense" area the report spoke of was the core part of the CBD, Main Street, where business was most concentrated. While Bartholomew's plan moved pedestrian traffic to the periphery of the CBD, Halprin's made it the centerpiece. LHA's Master Plan also encouraged reduced auto use, rather than promoting an increase in cars downtown. The firm promoted public transportation, bicycle and pedestrian routes. Nevertheless, Halprin included a large amount of parking in his plan, though not nearly as much as HB&J. While a comparison reveals that parking was located in some of the same areas, it also shows the degree to which Bartholomew valued parking more than Halprin.

LHA intended the Mall to be more than a stand-alone landscape within Charlottesville. It was meant to connect to three plazas, of which the city only had funding to build the smallest: Central Place. The largest plaza would have been the C&O Plaza at the East end of the mall (see cover image). It would have served as a grand entrance to the Mall, a government center located next to City Hall, and a tourist attraction. In spite of the scale and importance placed on C&O Plaza in the Master Plan Report, LHA wanted the plaza at the

West end of the Mall, Vinegar Hill Plaza, to be the first completed. The firm wrote, “Further development of that long-vacant piece of urban renewal land needs immediate stimulation, since downtown will never feel complete without some development in that area.” LHA’s design for the Vinegar Hill Plaza would have healed the broken connection between East and West Main Streets and reached out to surrounding Black neighborhoods with pedestrian connections. The design called for a park at the eastern tip of the Hill (see image below left) with three pedestrian routes spreading out westward into the community. A comparison of Bartholomew and Halprin’s plans shows that Halprin’s pedestrian areas spread into surrounding neighborhoods where Bartholomew’s stopped at parking garages.

LHA had to deal with designing urban renewal areas – not proposed new renewal areas, but projects already in progress because of the plans Bartholomew set forth. Clearance of the Garrett Street renewal area was well underway by the time the city began constructing the Mall. The Charlottesville Housing and Redevelopment Authority requested that Halprin include recommendations for the area so that they could attempt to coordinate their efforts. The firm was sensitive to the need for connection of Garrett with the rest of downtown to counteract some of the negative effects of urban renewal. They connected Garrett to the Mall through pedestrian routes and topography. The master plan stated that Fifth Street, which followed Moore’s Creek (since buried and piped), was the most important pedestrian linkage to the Mall:

The Creek Park designed to follow the existing creek running north/south through Garrett St. renewal area, is a vital part of the plan. It serves as a southerly extension of Fifth St. link to the historic District. It gives identity and backbone to the residential sector of the renewal area. It provides a direct connection to the downtown commercial area from the renewal area. And it provides a safe and easy way for the elderly to get downtown.

The park would have physically connected housing in the Garrett Street urban renewal area to the Mall and Moore’s Creek watershed, which once played a significant role in the topography of the Garret Street area. It would have provided a natural pedestrian route to the Mall from what Halprin hoped would be a diverse residential area.

Present State of the Central Business District

Though LHA left the project in the late 1970s, change on and around the Mall has continued. It struggled financially for nearly twenty years
before the CBD finally began to turn around in the 1990s. As Mitchell Van Yahres predicted, the Mall did not take off immediately because it was only the first step in a larger set of solutions for Charlottesville. As commerce has steadily grown on the Mall through the 1980s and 1990s, new types of businesses and patrons have altered the identity of Main Street. The CBD has gone from providing necessities to luxuries and entertainment. Restaurants have seemingly grown exponentially, drawing students from UVa, tourists from Monticello, and affluent residents of the city and surrounding county.

Though the Mall is the most visible remnant of mid-to-late twentieth-century planning in Charlottesville, many other aspects of this period have continued relevance in the twenty-first century. Bartholomew's proposals for a road system are still under discussion today, particularly in respect to the highly controversial Meadowcreek Parkway. Some of the parking Bartholomew recommended is still in use today and the suburban shopping center scale of Vinegar Hill continues. The biggest impact Bartholomew had on Charlottesville is a void rather than a presence. In Vinegar Hill and the Garrett Street urban renewal area, a sense of age, context, and connection to the rest of the city are lacking to this day.

The Halprin firm had a major effect on housing, civic institutions, preservation and the continued vitality of the downtown area. Residents, drawn to the Mall through Halprin's design, serve to protect it by providing a 24-hour presence downtown and advocating for the Mall's continual

Lawrence Halprin Associates, Charlottesville Illustrative Site Plan (c. 1974). Penn Architectural Archives.
Some of the locations LHA suggested for civic institutions have also come to fruition. The old Post Office building, location of the current downtown library, was LHA's second choice for a library site. The firm also proposed a new recreation center in the armory, which is in use today. These institutions make downtown a community center, rather than just a commercial district. Philosophically, Halprin's plan has certainly had a greater impact than that of Bartholomew's on current ideals in the city planning department. The language of the most recent city plan echoes the views of the Halprin firm. While citizens may not realize that the Mall design is part of a larger plan, through Cole Hendrix and long-time Director of Planning, Satyendra Huja, hired in 1973 to replace Tom Conger, the city government has internalized many elements of Halprin's plan.

Through apartments, entertainment, restaurants and boutiques encouraged by the Mall, downtown has found a niche that allows the nineteenth-century building fabric and eighteenth-century infrastructure to remain in use. During its heyday in the early twentieth century, downtown Charlottesville served the essential needs of the entire population of Albemarle County. Lawyers, doctors, barbers, bankers, grocers, bakers, and clothiers—all were located in the downtown area. Before the 1950s, there was no suburban competition for essential services. Today, downtown is a niche market; with the exception of the movie theater and a few inexpensive restaurants, the Mall primarily serves an upper middle class population. Most of the businesses are upscale restaurants and boutiques. Many people lament a lack of essential services—
grocery stores, hardware stores, and department stores— that prevents downtown from serving as large a portion of the population as it did 60 years ago. However, the Mall has not prevented these essential services from remaining downtown. The culprit is a larger trend toward national chains replacing family-owned businesses and establishing corporate policies that limit store placement to suburban areas, thus reinforcing suburban sprawl.

Were it not for the Mall, it is just as likely that the area would be completely deserted or given over to large-scale office buildings. Suburban development and national corporate takeovers of essential services have made it difficult for downtowns all over the country, not just ones with pedestrian malls, to retain essential service and retail functions.

More than a Mall...

The Mall is more than a brick floor; it is an intricately designed landscape that encompasses its floor: carefully planned minimalist pattern of brick pavers, rainwater drainage runnels and grey banding; walls: the mostly brick surface of historic buildings; ceiling: a soft tree canopy composed of willow oaks; entrances and exits created by a historic grid of blocks; and all of the street furnishings and human interactions in between. Conceptually and physically, it is intimately connected to the history of Charlottesville, including that of Vinegar Hill and urban renewal. This history ties the Mall to issues of race relations, social hierarchies, and urban development that go back as far as the founding of the city. The success of the Mall is reliant on a bigger picture, which includes this history, as well as a relationship with housing, transportation, surrounding development and community support. Halprin's scheme was inclusive of many facets of the functioning city.

The Mall has been a catalyst for change, not an isolated commercial district that acted as a solution on its own. In 1977, one year after the Mall's completion, Landscape Architect August Hecksher wrote about the pitfalls of malls as well as their potential, "The mall is best seen as a tool among many in restoring the attractiveness of downtown and should come as the capstone upon other related improvements."

Essential to its long-term success has been the ability of city planner Satyendra Huja and Manager Cole Hendrix to understand the Mall as part of a whole. These figures, along with others in the city government, have implemented the preservation, housing, and transportation strategies of Halprin's plans on a continual basis. The Mall is a crucial part of the identity of the City of Charlottesville today, for good reason: it represents an era of significant change and is an example of excellence in design and planning, which was of its time and place, rooted in the past and responsive to change.


5 Comprehensive Plan, Charlottesville: Department of Community Development (August, 1978), p. 11.


7 Bartholomew, A Preliminary Report upon the Scope, 3.

8 Ibid.

9 Jacobs asserts that successful streets should have pedestrian access points at least every 300 feet. Charlottesville’s blocks are only 200 feet long – giving an abundance of access points to the Mall above and beyond Jacob’s requirement. Compare this to Monument Avenue in Richmond, which has an entry every 275 feet making it very accessible, and Philadelphia, the blocks of which are 600 feet long, making them difficult for the pedestrian to navigate [Alan Jacobs, Great Streets (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), p. 302].

10 A Plan of the Town of Charlottesville, After 1818, Albemarle County Historical Society (now the Albemarle Charlottesville Historical Society).

11 Ibid.


13 Charlottesville City Council Minutes, “Recommendation from Planning Comm. Re: Master Plan and Workable Program,” City of Charlottesville,


17 Ibid., 15.


20 Ibid., 162-3.


23 Ibid., 10.

24 Ibid., 7.


27 Charles Barbour, Personal Interview, December 16, 2009.*


31 Saunders and Shackelford, *Urban Renewal*, 34.


35 Ibid.

36 These were just two of the many well known critiques of urban renewal which the authors argued caused both social and economic problems rather than solving them. In spite of severe criticism, urban renewal was an institutionalized and accepted way of planning a city during the 1950s-the mid-1980s [Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*; Anderson, Martin, *The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal 1949-62*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964)].


38 "Petitioners Oppose Negro Housing Site," *Daily Progress*, Charlottesville, 11 April 1959, p. 3.


40 Bartholomew estimated that, by 1980, the population of Charlottesville would reach 60,000, double what the population was in 1956. By 1979, the population had reached approximately 43,000 [Harland Bartholomew and Associates, *A Report Upon Population and Economic Background*, (Charlottesville: Pity Planning Commission, 1956), p. 18; Comprehensive Plan 1979, p. 26].


42 Ibid.

43 Bartholomew, *CBD Report*.


Ibid., 7.


Ibid.


Anonymous, Penn Architectural Archives, Lawrence Halprin Associates Collection, Charlottesville, Virginia Project Files, 014. Box 116, I.A. 3846, Correspondence File.


65 Hirsch, Lawrence Halprin’s Reactionary Urbanism, 1.


67 Norm Kondy, telephone interview, November 17, 2009.


73 Kondy, November 17, 2009.

74 Bern Ewert, Personal Interview, March 24, 2010; Gilliam, February 11, 2010; Rinehart, December 17, 2009.
Council member George Gilliam remembers that a public hearing about the Mall was held in 1973 after the Take Part Workshop. Of the approximately 300 people in attendance, many were local business owners. Not a single person stood up to speak in favor of the Mall, though dozens made statements in opposition.


Lawrence Halprin Associates, CBD Master Plan Report, 23.

90 Ibid., 17.

91 Ibid., 18.


93 Ibid.


95 Ibid., 17.

96 Ibid., 13.

97 Ibid., 20.


102 Satyendra Huja, Personal Interview, January 5, 2010.


105 Hecksher, *Open Spaces*, 27.

*Personal Oral History Interviews conducted by the author will be available at the Albemarle Charlottesville Historical Society.*
LHA's 1973 Illustrative CBD Master Plan drawing depicts the full extent of LHA's vision for downtown Charlottesville. The mall appears as a central figure among a sequence of interconnected spaces. In the northwest corner of the plan, the Vinegar Hill development is shown as a multiple-use complex of housing, commerce, and public space. In the southeast corner of the plan, the Garrett Street development is shown as a primarily residential development connected to the Mall and C&O Plaza by a linear park along a tributary of Moore's Creek. Halprin Collection at Penn Architectural Archives.